AzerTelecom and Telecom Armenia have signed agreements to route Armenia’s international internet traffic through Azerbaijan.

Under the agreements, AzerTelecom will provide internet traffic transit to Armenia using its own telecommunications infrastructure.

The agreement marks a significant change in Armenia’s telecommunications network. Armenia’s international internet connectivity has traditionally relied on routes passing through Georgia and Iran. The new arrangement would make Azerbaijan a transit country for Armenian internet traffic.

The development is likely to generate concern in Armenia, as it would place part of the country’s communications infrastructure on networks controlled by Azerbaijan. Telecommunications infrastructure is a strategic national security asset, and the agreement would create a new dependency on a state that remains Armenia’s principal adversary.

For many Armenians, the agreement recalls Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Berdzor (Lachin) Corridor, which cut Artsakh’s only land connection to Armenia and the outside world before the forced displacement of Artsakh’s Armenian population. The blockade demonstrated the risks of allowing critical lifelines to depend on routes controlled by Azerbaijan, making any new strategic dependency a matter of serious concern.

Neither company disclosed what share of Armenia’s internet traffic would transit through Azerbaijan, whether the route would serve as a primary or backup connection, or what safeguards would be in place to ensure the security and uninterrupted operation of the service.

Cybersecurity specialist Ruben Muradyan also addressed the issue in greater detail. He wrote:

“First, let’s understand what is actually stated in the press release:

  1. Team Telecom and AzerTelecom will mutually utilize each other’s telecommunications infrastructure for Internet transit.
  2. As part of this cooperation, traffic from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan will be routed through Team Telecom’s infrastructure.
  3. But this is not the only implication, and it is the most important one. An agreement on reciprocal Internet transit means that Armenian Internet traffic may also be routed through AzerTelecom’s infrastructure.

What are the risks?

  1. Traffic passing through AzerTelecom’s network can be monitored and analyzed.
  2. The actual content of communications will most likely remain inaccessible, as nearly all modern Internet communications are protected by TLS encryption. While man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are theoretically possible, the likelihood is relatively low.
  3. AzerTelecom will be able to pass Armenian traffic through Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) systems, allowing it to profile users and analyze their online behavior. To be clear, this is not about accessing the contents of communications, but rather the metadata associated with those connections.
  4. Individuals and organizations using static IP addresses face the greatest risk. Such addresses can often be linked to specific users, making de-anonymization significantly easier.
  5. AzerTelecom will also have greater opportunities to conduct BGP route poisoning, enabling it to redirect traffic of interest through networks under its control.
  6. At present, these risks primarily affect Team Telecom subscribers. Nevertheless, I would not place excessive confidence in assumptions of complete security.
  7. People in sensitive positions, including politicians, journalists, NGO employees, and staff of strategically important companies, should seriously consider using a VPN on all of their devices at all times.