Armenia and Azerbaijan have expanded their negotiations to include the management of transboundary water resources, introducing another strategically sensitive issue into bilateral talks amid Azerbaijan’s continued occupation of Armenian territory and unresolved security concerns.

Following their November 12 meeting in Dublin, Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev welcomed the establishment of working groups on the management of transboundary rivers.

According to the statement issued by Pashinyan’s office, the leaders emphasized the importance of environmental cooperation and the management of shared water resources.

The statement, however, provided no details regarding the working groups’ composition, authority, negotiating mandate, or safeguards protecting Armenia’s sovereign control over its water infrastructure.

The announcement comes as negotiations between Yerevan and Baku increasingly encompass strategic infrastructure, including transportation networks, electricity transmission lines and now water resources.

Water Security Amid Azerbaijan’s Territorial Claims

Water resources are particularly sensitive given Azerbaijan’s military incursions into Armenia, Aliyev’s claims concerning Armenian territory, and Azerbaijan’s acquisition of major reservoirs and hydropower facilities following its occupation of Artsakh.

In April 2021, Aliyev referred to Lake Sevan as “Goyche” during a conference at ADA University in Baku, where he also described Syunik as historically Azerbaijani territory and spoke of the eventual return of Azerbaijanis to Yerevan.

Although Aliyev denied that these statements constituted territorial claims, his repeated use of Azerbaijani names for Armenian locations has accompanied Baku’s broader promotion of the so-called “Western Azerbaijan” narrative, which encompasses territories within the internationally recognized borders of Armenia.

Following Azerbaijan’s military incursions into Armenia in 2021 and 2022, Azerbaijani forces established positions in strategically important border areas, including near Sev Lake in Syunik.

Azerbaijan’s continued military presence on Armenian territory remains a significant security concern, particularly in areas near strategic infrastructure and natural resources.

The Loss of Artsakh’s Strategic Water Infrastructure

Azerbaijan gained control of major reservoirs and hydropower facilities in Artsakh following the 2020 war and its September 2023 military offensive, which culminated in the forced displacement and ethnic cleansing of Artsakh’s Armenian population.

Among these assets is the Sarsang Reservoir, one of Artsakh’s most important sources of irrigation water and hydroelectric power. Control over the reservoir carries significant implications for regional water distribution, energy production and agriculture.

Concerns over Armenia’s own water security had already emerged following the 2020 war.

In January 2021, then-Environment Minister Romanos Petrosyan stated that areas containing water sources feeding the Vorotan and Arpa rivers had come under Azerbaijani control following the transfer of Karvachar.

The Environment Ministry subsequently clarified that Petrosyan was referring not to the rivers’ direct sources, but to certain territories within their catchment basins containing springs that feed the rivers. The ministry maintained that the impact on the water system feeding Lake Sevan was limited.

Nevertheless, the episode underscored the relationship between territorial control and Armenia’s long-term water security.

The establishment of working groups on transboundary rivers therefore introduces negotiations over resources whose strategic importance has already been demonstrated by the territorial and infrastructural losses suffered since 2020.

The Expansion of Negotiations Over Strategic Infrastructure

The inclusion of water resources follows a series of developments involving Armenia’s transportation and energy infrastructure.

As previously reported by 301, Armenian and Azerbaijani officials met in Goris on October 8 to discuss electricity transmission lines through Syunik, despite Azerbaijan’s continued occupation of Armenian territory.

Officials did not disclose the proposed routes or specify what agreements had been reached.

On November 12, 301 also reported that Pashinyan’s administration was advancing legislation related to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), amid unresolved sovereignty and security concerns.

The project would provide Azerbaijan with its long-demanded transport connection to Nakhijevan through Armenia’s Syunik Province. Aliyev continues to refer to the route as the “Zangezur corridor,” despite Armenia’s objections to the terminology.

The Dublin meeting also addressed the planned interconnection of Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s electricity grids, further expanding the scope of bilateral discussions over strategic infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to demand amendments to Armenia’s Constitution as a condition for signing the peace agreement, while Armenian prisoners of war, civilian detainees and former Artsakh officials remain imprisoned in Baku.

These unresolved issues form the political and security backdrop against which negotiations over Armenia’s water resources are now taking place.

Unanswered Questions Over Armenia’s Sovereignty

Transboundary water cooperation is a recognized component of international environmental policy and can address legitimate concerns, including water quality, pollution prevention, flood management and the sustainable use of shared rivers.

However, depending on their scope, such agreements can also affect water withdrawals, reservoir construction, hydropower development and the exchange of sensitive infrastructure information.

No publicly disclosed agreement currently grants Azerbaijan authority over Armenia’s water resources, and the establishment of working groups does not itself confer such authority.

The concern lies in the potential scope of future arrangements, particularly given Azerbaijan’s military presence on Armenian territory, Aliyev’s territorial rhetoric and the loss of strategic water infrastructure in Artsakh.

Pashinyan’s administration has yet to publicly clarify what authority the working groups will possess, whether they will negotiate binding commitments, or what guarantees will protect Armenia’s independent management of its water resources.

As negotiations with Azerbaijan expand from transportation and energy infrastructure to water resources, the absence of these details raises broader concerns about the cumulative implications for Armenia’s sovereignty and national security.

Any future agreement on transboundary water management must be assessed not only on its environmental merits, but also on whether it preserves Armenia’s sovereign authority over its natural resources and strategic infrastructure.

Until the mandate and scope of the working groups are made public, the potential implications for Armenia’s water security remain unresolved.