Pashinyan’s government has unveiled its 2026–2031 five-year program, laying out sweeping changes involving the Armenian Apostolic Church, citizenship, the Constitution, relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, artificial intelligence, policing, surveillance, taxation and Armenia’s broader state doctrine.

Among the most consequential provisions is the government’s formal inclusion of changes to the leadership of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The program calls for removing the Church’s de facto head, appointing a Locum Tenens, adopting a new Church charter and holding a new election for the Catholicos of All Armenians.

The inclusion of these steps in an official government program formalizes direct state involvement in the internal leadership and governance of the Armenian Apostolic Church, following Pashinyan’s prolonged campaign against the Church leadership.

The program also proposes a major overhaul of Armenia’s citizenship rules. Pashinyan’s government plans to introduce a residency requirement even for ethnic Armenians seeking Armenian citizenship, marking a significant change in Armenia’s traditional relationship with the Diaspora.

Under the proposed approach, citizenship would be tied more closely to physical residency and direct integration into the Republic of Armenia rather than Armenian origin alone.

Another central priority is the adoption of a new Constitution. The government says the document will define the fundamental principles governing Armenia’s internal and external relations and will ultimately be put to a referendum.

The issue extends far beyond technical constitutional reform. Pashinyan has already argued that the new Constitution should abandon references connected to the Declaration of Independence. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has repeatedly demanded constitutional changes in Armenia, claiming that existing provisions contain territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

The five-year program also outlines a major expansion of artificial intelligence across public administration and law enforcement.

Pashinyan’s government plans to introduce an AI-based policing system capable of risk assessment, individual profiling and predicting crime trends. These measures are expected to operate alongside an expanded “Smart City” surveillance infrastructure.

The proposal raises serious questions about the scale of state surveillance and the power granted to algorithms to profile individuals, assess supposed risk and identify citizens as potential threats before any crime has been committed.

More broadly, the program adopts what it describes as an “AI First” approach to public administration, meaning artificial intelligence should be considered the first option when addressing problems within the state system.

Combined with AI policing, predictive crime analysis, individual profiling and increasingly interconnected state databases, the policy points toward a far more automated and data-driven model of government.

The program also places expanded relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey at the center of Armenia’s regional strategy.

Pashinyan’s government plans to increase contacts between Armenian and Azerbaijani business communities and expand bilateral trade. The policy is being advanced while Armenian prisoners remain held in Baku and major humanitarian consequences of the forced displacement of Artsakh’s Armenian population remain unresolved.

The document further states that Armenia’s regional policy should make it not only possible, but “comfortable,” for the country to live in its immediate region without external support.

That objective is closely tied to deeper relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, signaling a broader strategy in which regional normalization is expected to play an increasingly central role in Armenia’s security and future development.

With Turkey, the government plans to pursue the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border, establish diplomatic relations and create at least two modern border crossings.

The land border has remained closed since Turkey shut it in 1993. Despite years of normalization negotiations, full reopening has still not taken place.

The treatment of Artsakh in the 90-page program is also notable. The word “Karabakh” appears only once, in a section on social policy that promises continued housing assistance for 10,000 displaced families.

There is no broader political discussion of Artsakh in that reference. Instead, displaced Armenians are addressed primarily through the framework of domestic housing assistance.

The government also plans to further expand Armenia’s universal income declaration system for individuals and use the information collected to make social credits more targeted.

The system gives the state an increasingly detailed picture of citizens’ personal finances while linking that information more closely to access to government benefits and social assistance.

Taken together, the 2026–2031 program outlines a significant restructuring of Armenia’s political and administrative direction. It combines direct state intervention in Church governance, constitutional changes, tighter citizenship requirements, expanded financial reporting, closer economic engagement with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and a rapid shift toward AI-based administration, policing and surveillance.

The program therefore extends far beyond a conventional five-year policy agenda. It sets out a broader transformation of how Pashinyan’s government intends Armenia to define its institutions, citizenship, regional relationships, internal security and state identity over the coming years.