On August 24, 2026, Nikol Pashinyan presented his government’s five-year program for 2026–2031 to Armenia’s Parliament, laying out a sweeping political, constitutional and geopolitical agenda that would reshape several of the foundations on which post-Soviet Armenia has operated for more than three decades.
At the center of the program is Pashinyan’s claim that Armenia has already entered what he calls the “Fourth Republic,” built around his “Real Armenia” ideology. He argued that the June 7 parliamentary election gave this approach a popular mandate and presented the next five years as a period for consolidating that transformation.
One of the most consequential elements is the planned new Constitution.
Pashinyan said the draft will be published in the coming months and reiterated that it must contain no reference to Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence. The Declaration is one of the foundational documents of Armenian statehood and includes a reference to the December 1, 1989 decision on the reunification of Soviet Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The constitutional agenda is closely tied to Pashinyan’s broader effort to close the chapter on the Karabakh movement.
He said Armenia has made the decision not to continue the Karabakh, or Artsakh, movement and claimed that the June 7 election gave him a mandate to bring that political chapter to an end.
That position now sits alongside a broader commitment to the U.S.-backed peace process with Azerbaijan.
Pashinyan said Armenia will continue implementing the peace agenda and confirmed that the TRIPP, widely referred to as the “Trump Route,” will move forward. According to him, the route will follow the Soviet-era Nrnadzor-Agarak railway alignment and could eventually connect Armenia to Russia and Central Asia through Azerbaijan while also serving east-west freight traffic.
The government is also seeking major changes to Armenia’s railway system.
Pashinyan called on Russia to sell the concession rights to Armenia’s railway network to a mutually acceptable third country, citing sanctions-related risks and the need to integrate Armenia into wider international transport corridors.
The future of Armenia’s relationship with Russia was another major theme.
Pashinyan described Armenia’s gradual move away from its traditional security relationship with Moscow as a “natural” development, linking it to his government’s peace agenda with Azerbaijan and normalization process with Turkey.
He also argued that Russia can no longer perform the security-guarantor role it once held for Armenia, pointing to events in 2021, 2022 and 2023.
At the same time, his government is pursuing closer integration with Europe.
Pashinyan said Armenia will soon submit an application for European Union membership. He added that any referendum on joining the EU would come only after Brussels responds and the terms of Armenia’s reform and accession path become clearer.
The government is also targeting 2029 for visa-free travel between Armenia and the European Union.
Another major foreign-policy shift concerns the Armenian Genocide.
Pashinyan said international recognition of the Armenian Genocide will no longer be part of Armenia’s foreign-policy agenda and argued that the issue should no longer be “weaponized” in international relations.
His domestic agenda also formalizes his confrontation with the Armenian Apostolic Church.
The five-year program includes the removal of the Catholicos and what Pashinyan describes as the “reform” of the Church, moving what had previously been a political campaign into the government’s official program.
The inclusion is significant because it places a direct confrontation with the leadership and internal structure of Armenia’s national church inside a formal state policy document.
The program was presented against the backdrop of continuing problems inside Armenia’s armed forces.
Pashinyan acknowledged that suicides, killings and other non-combat deaths remain a serious issue. Three Armenian servicemen died in non-combat circumstances within just 10 days in August, underscoring a problem that has continued despite repeated government pledges to reform conditions in the military.
The fate of Armenian hostages held in Baku also remains unresolved.
Pashinyan said their return will remain on the government’s agenda, but no breakthrough was announced.
Taken together, the 2026–2031 program outlines far more than a conventional five-year governing plan.
It seeks to redefine Armenia’s constitutional foundations, formally end the political legacy of the Artsakh movement, reduce the country’s traditional strategic dependence on Russia, deepen integration with Western institutions, normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, remove Armenian Genocide recognition from the state’s foreign-policy priorities, and intervene directly in the future leadership and structure of the Armenian Apostolic Church.
Pashinyan presents these changes as the consolidation of a new Armenian state model.
For Armenia, however, the next five years will determine whether that model becomes permanent and how much of the political, historical and institutional framework inherited from the previous three decades survives it.
