The summer of 2025 ushered in a new and intensified phase in Russia-Azerbaijan relations — one that had long been anticipated but had never reached this level, even during earlier periods of tension. Until now, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had often appeared to “understand each other.” This time, however, the situation is unfolding with a dangerous level of seriousness.
On June 27, approximately 50 individuals of Azerbaijani origin — most of them Russian citizens — were arrested en masse in Yekaterinburg. Two people died during the arrests, and three others were hospitalized in critical condition. Russia’s Investigative Committee claimed it had uncovered an “ethnic criminal group” allegedly linked to multiple murders, a fatal alcohol poisoning incident, and other serious crimes.
Baku responded sharply. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry demanded urgent explanations and accountability. The Azerbaijani Parliament canceled a planned visit to Moscow. That same day, Baku announced the suspension of all cultural events involving Russia, including concerts, festivals, and theatrical performances.
The crisis escalated further on June 30, when Azerbaijani police raided the offices of Sputnik Azerbaijan, detaining Editor-in-Chief Igor Kartavikhin and his deputy. Russian diplomats were denied access to the detainees. State-controlled Azerbaijani media launched an overtly anti-Russian campaign, portraying Russia as a hegemonic power that views others as “second-class people.” Pro-government journalist Afgan Mukhtarly even called for the Russian embassy to be burned — a tone that sharply contrasts with the image of “partnership” Baku had long tried to maintain with Moscow.
In response, on July 1, Russia recalled its ambassador from Baku. Still, neither Putin nor Aliyev has commented publicly on the unfolding crisis. Moscow continues to insist that “law enforcement, not politicians, will provide answers.” But that line no longer satisfies Baku. Aliyev has not forgiven the December 2024 plane crash involving Azerbaijan’s AZAL airline, which Baku claims occurred due to Russian military interference. Despite Putin’s formal apology, Aliyev demanded criminal accountability — a demand that remains unmet. In the aftermath, Azerbaijan closed Russian cultural centers, banned Sputnik, and accused Russia of cyberattacks.
These developments signal a clear shift: Baku is now pursuing a systemic anti-Russian policy, abandoning even the pretense of neutrality. Where Azerbaijan once played both sides, it is now openly moving toward confrontation.
Moscow, for its part, is still trying to maintain a “partnership mask,” but Baku’s sharp actions leave little room for illusion. Aliyev has frozen high-level contacts with Moscow, skipped the Victory Day parade, allowed anti-Russian messaging in state media, blocked Russian outlets, and severed cultural ties. At the same time, he is expanding cooperation with Ukraine and strengthening relations with the West and Israel.
Ukraine, too, appears to be seizing the opportunity to deepen the rift between Moscow and Baku. According to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Kyiv is attempting to provoke Azerbaijan into continuing its anti-Russian trajectory. At the beginning of July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky held a phone call with Aliyev — an act Moscow interpreted as a direct provocation.
As of now, six employees of Sputnik Azerbaijan and one editor from Ruptly have been detained in Baku. None have made contact with the outside world. Police have also arrested several Russian nationals, accusing them of cybercrimes and drug trafficking. Russia claims these detainees have been beaten — photographs and videos show visible signs of physical abuse and bloodied faces. Russian diplomats have been denied access to them.
Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova also issued a warning to Russian citizens planning to travel to Azerbaijan, urging them to consider the current risks.
As strange as it may sound, this conflict may open up strategic opportunities for Armenia — if Yerevan can respond with clarity and foresight. With Moscow and Baku drifting apart, Armenia could seek to strengthen its position, whether by reestablishing ties with Russia under new terms or by engaging with alternative centers of influence. However, the current Armenian government has failed to capitalize on this window, even voting in Azerbaijan’s favor in recent international forums, such as the OSCE.
One of Ilham Aliyev’s likely long-term ambitions is to expand Azerbaijani influence not only in the region but also into territories within the Russian Federation — notably the Derbent region of Dagestan, home to a large Azerbaijani population. While this may seem far-fetched, it is not accidental. Dagestan, as part of Russia’s multiethnic confederation, has experienced frequent tensions between local communities and the central authorities. Aliyev’s aspirations could destabilize the region and further complicate Russia’s role in the South Caucasus.
Under these circumstances, it is crucial for Armenia and neighboring countries to approach regional developments with caution and strategic awareness. Azerbaijan’s shift toward confrontation, combined with its new geopolitical ambitions, could fuel future conflicts and transform the status quo in the South Caucasus.
