by Albert Najaryan
In modern-day Armenia, where politics are often divided, and people don’t always trust public institutions, the Armenian Apostolic Church has a special, but also difficult and important role. It is not a political party, nor government agency, or foreign-funded civil society structure. The Armenian Apostolic Church is an institution that existed before the modern Armenian state by more than 1600 years, and this is why it remains one of the last sources of Armenian identity and public life. But today, there’s a growing effort to make the Church look bad, ignore it, and keep it out of the political debate. It is presented as modernization, accountability, or reform, but the political tone, the messages, and the coordination suggest something more strategic. In this analysis we will try to figure out the patterns which look like more political targeting, rather than institutional criticism.
Historical Memory and The Logic of Pressure
The Armenian Church has faced attacks throughout its history and these were not usually accidental events. The persecution of the Armenian Church began in the 19th century under the rule of the Russian Tsars with the effort to limit the Church’s independence by reforming its administration and confiscating some of its properties. The Armenian Church was also subject to systematic repression under the Soviet regime. The persecution of the clergy and closing of the monasteries resulted in the reduction of religion to ritualistic symbolism and total state control over the practice of religion. However, the Soviet’s purpose was not to correct the Church’s ideology, but rather, trying to gain political control.
Back when Armenia didn’t have a state, the Church was an integral part of the national culture. It held onto tradition through language, manuscripts, education, and collective memory, and was a source of stability and identity through exile and hardship. The Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin was the focal point for the Church and the nation throughout many ages.
When current political narratives often portray the Church as “old-fashioned”, “corrupt” or “politically manipulative” without balanced institutional dialogue or facts, the objective shifts from reforming to just delegitimization. The main issue in this situation isn’t the criticism itself. In the democratic societies, institutions must be accountable, but the problem is when political elites use the grotesque wording of criticism as a way to share political messages and to polarize the people. And here is the place where we meet the patterns.
The Church and The Question of Independence
The government and many of the organizations that are found in modern-day Armenia are directly or indirectly controlled by the political powers. There is a fractured media environment that has created a very polarized media landscape. In addition, Civil Society organizations in Armenia are funded by foreign sources of fundings, and most of the business structures are also tied with political interests. Under these conditions, the Armenian Apostolic Church is one of the few institutions that are not structurally dependent on the current Armenian government or any business side.
It is the independence of the Church from the political authorities that creates great discomfort for them because the Church has the ability to create moral perspectives that are contrary to the policies of the state. The Church can speak to social frustration and make no calculations for electoral gain. It also has the ability to create symbolic power that political parties are unable to create.
The growth of tension between the Church and the political authorities creates a greater divide within institutions. Instead of dialogue between the two institutions, we see aggressive public statements made, social media campaigns, and etc. By doing this, ruling political party and other institutions have created further polarization in Armenia at a time when Armenia is already experiencing extraordinary external pressures.
Polarization As a Political Tool
Armenia is in a difficult geopolitical situation. The current reality of safety after the 2020 war, along with ongoing issues with Azerbaijan and uncertainty about alliances, increases the importance of internal harmony. However, the political environment at home has become more divided and polarized between different groups and ideologies. For example urban versus traditional, progressive versus conservative, secular versus religious.
Using religion, especially the church, as an enemy in politics can make it seem like a battleground for symbols. When politicians use religion (the church) to compete against each other, society starts to fall apart. If I support the government, I may feel like I have to oppose the church. If I oppose the government, I may feel like I have to support the church no matter what it does. The result of this setup is that people’s views become more extreme, rather than making positive changes. Such polarization benefits short term political narratives but weakens long term national stability.
What Happens If the Church Collapses Institutionally
The question is not theological rather than structural. What would Armenia look like if the Armenian Apostolic Church were significantly weakened or internally destabilized?
First, there would be no more moral authority. In societies where people don’t trust politicians, symbolic institutions become even more important. The Church performs ceremonies that connect citizens to the historical roots of the nation, such as baptisms, funerals, and commemorations of genocide and war. They are more than just religious rituals, they also bring people together.
Second, diaspora relations can be negatively affected. The Church serves as a network that connects Armenian communities around the world. If the Church changes its form because of political pressure, this connection will become weaker when Armenia depends on the continued involvement of the diaspora.
Third, a lack of independence could set a bad example for other institutions as well. If the Church is seen as having little political influence by the public, it will lead to academic institutions, professional unions, and cultural institutions being more cautious and less willing to publicly express independent opinions.
Finally, the total collapse of the Church or the total breakdown of the Church does not guarantee there would be a more secular or more progressive society. In fact, it may lead to social disunity. This could even lead to social unrest. When traditional institutions are lost from society without new ones taking their place, radical groups often appear to fill the gap.
Between Reform and Confrontation
The Church has legitimate reasons to discuss transparency, internal governance and modernization, however these discussions should occur through institutional dialogue and not through public confrontational politics.
The political system of Armenia is still young and is in the process of developing a democratic culture. Therefore, weakening one of the last institutions that has historically been a part of society can have far more effects outside of the Church. A state with legitimacy does not need to run a campaign against religious authority. In place of conflict it will try to engage, negotiate and coexist. Moreover, when politicians turn religious institutions into enemies, they risk damaging something much deeper than just the religious hierarchy. They risk making people lose their trust in everything.
The Armenian Apostolic Church is not above criticism, but it has a right to not be made into an instrument to achieve political objectives. In a region where nothing is certain, Armenia cannot afford another source of internal conflict. The long-term cost of institutions falling apart would not only be seen in church attendance numbers. It would be measured by how well the country’s people are united.
In today’s geopolitical environment, cohesion is not something that can be viewed as a luxury. It is a necessity.
About the author
Albert Najaryan is a political analyst and researcher focused on democratization, governance, and regional security in the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe. He holds a Master’s degree in Human Rights and Democratization.
