by Davit Beglaryan
Democracy rests on a fundamental principle: citizens choose their government, not the other way around. When those in power begin determining which citizens are eligible to vote, the danger extends far beyond any single election. It strikes at the foundations of democratic representation.
On July 3, 2026, Armenia’s National Assembly adopted amendments to the Electoral Code under Nikol Pashinyan’s administration, introducing a new residency-based requirement for voting.
Under the legislation, Armenian citizens must have spent at least 366 days physically present in Armenia during a specified 730-day period to be eligible to vote in parliamentary elections. The qualifying period is calculated as of 48 days before an ordinary election or 28 days before a snap election. Certain exceptions apply, but migrant workers are not exempted as a distinct category.
This is not simply a restriction on voting from abroad. It changes who is legally entitled to cast a ballot.
The consequences extend well beyond Armenian citizens permanently residing in the Diaspora. They also affect seasonal migrant workers from Armenia’s towns and villages, many of whom spend months abroad earning money to support their families.
Their homes remain in Armenia. Their families live in Armenia. Their earnings help sustain households and local communities. Yet citizens who fail to meet the new physical-presence requirement can lose their eligibility to vote, even if they return to Armenia for election day.
A citizen can leave Armenia because of limited economic opportunities, only to return and discover that the law no longer permits them to vote for the authorities responsible for shaping those opportunities.
But the deeper concern is not limited to migrant workers or the Diaspora.
The amendments establish a precedent in which a parliamentary majority has introduced an additional condition determining which citizens may exercise the right to vote.
That raises a fundamental question about the boundaries of political power.
Authoritarian consolidation does not always begin with the abolition of elections. Elections may continue, political parties may remain active, and ballots may still be counted. Democratic competition can nevertheless be weakened when those in power restrict political participation or alter the rules governing the electorate.
The concern is therefore not merely whether elections take place, but whether the rules governing participation remain consistent with constitutional guarantees and equal political rights.
Today, the additional condition is the number of days spent in Armenia.
Taken to its logical extreme, the same approach raises an uncomfortable hypothetical: what if a future parliamentary majority attempted to restrict voting eligibility according to income, employment, or even membership in the ruling “Civil Contract” party?
The current legislation does not impose such conditions, and there is no established evidence that they are planned. The hypothetical instead illustrates why the limits of legislative power over voting eligibility matter.
A parliamentary majority should not be able to redefine the electorate without clear constitutional authority and compelling justification.
The issue has become particularly relevant amid renewed discussions among senior officials about possible snap parliamentary elections.
On October 22, Pashinyan did not rule out early elections if the necessary parliamentary support could not be secured to submit a new draft Constitution to a referendum. On November 5, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan also discussed the possibility of snap elections if the constitutional process failed.
These discussions come after the introduction of voting eligibility requirements that could exclude citizens who were previously entitled to return to Armenia and vote.
If snap elections are called, the immediate question will be how many citizens are affected.
How many seasonal workers, temporary residents abroad, and other Armenian citizens will fail to meet the new requirement?
No comprehensive public assessment of the number of affected voters has been established in this article. Without reliable figures, the full impact on electoral participation and representation remains unclear.
The constitutional implications are equally significant.
Article 48(1) of Armenia’s Constitution guarantees the right to vote in National Assembly elections to Armenian citizens who have reached the age of 18. Article 48(4) identifies specific categories of individuals excluded from exercising electoral rights, including persons deprived of legal capacity by a final court judgment and certain convicted prisoners.
The constitutional text does not expressly establish a minimum period of physical presence in Armenia as a condition for voting in parliamentary elections.
This distinction is central to the legal dispute.
The July amendments introduce a statutory eligibility requirement beyond citizenship and adulthood. Human rights organizations argue that the requirement conflicts with Article 48 and disproportionately restricts voting rights, particularly for citizens who work or reside abroad.
The constitutional question is whether the legislature has the authority to introduce such a condition and whether it can be justified under the applicable constitutional principles governing fundamental rights.
A residency requirement is not automatically incompatible with democratic standards in every jurisdiction. However, its compatibility with Armenia’s Constitution cannot be assumed merely because similar restrictions exist elsewhere.
The amendments were also adopted through an expedited parliamentary procedure, despite objections from human rights organizations and concerns raised during the legislative process.
A change affecting the electorate itself warrants more than a parliamentary majority’s approval. It requires a clear constitutional basis, transparent justification, and meaningful public scrutiny.
The right to vote is not a privilege granted by the ruling party. It is a constitutional guarantee that limits the power of the ruling party.
Governments change. Parliamentary majorities come and go. The electorate must not become something that each successive majority can reshape according to its political interests.
This does not establish that the July amendments were designed to manipulate future election results. Such a conclusion would require evidence of political intent and the legislation’s actual electoral effects.
But the risk deserves scrutiny regardless of whether such intent can be demonstrated.
The danger lies in allowing the boundaries of political participation to become increasingly dependent on legislative decisions made by those whose authority is derived from the very elections they regulate.
For Armenia, where labor migration has long been a reality for many families, the consequences are particularly serious.
Citizens who work abroad do not cease to belong to the political community of Armenia. Their obligations, families, property, and futures may remain closely tied to the country.
Their absence should not automatically be treated as evidence of a diminished stake in its future.
As discussions of possible snap elections continue, the authorities must account for the consequences of the new eligibility rules, including the number of citizens excluded and the constitutional justification for their exclusion.
Democracy can be undermined not only by manipulating the ballots that are counted, but also by changing whose ballots are legally permitted to be cast.
Before Armenia holds another parliamentary election, one question demands a clear answer:
Who is entitled to choose Armenia’s next government, and who has been excluded from that choice?