A new line is appearing in Azerbaijan’s information space: Armenia is supposedly reviving territorial claims against Azerbaijan, interfering in its sovereignty and undermining the peace process.
On September 23, Azerbaijani media reported that Baku had postponed planned Armenian-Azerbaijani expert meetings in Armenia under the “Bridge of Peace” initiative.
Reports citing unnamed sources attributed the decision to what Baku considers an intensifying information campaign against Azerbaijan. They further claimed that territorial claims against Azerbaijan and interference in questions of Azerbaijani sovereignty were receiving significant support from Armenian state institutions.
On its own, another hostile narrative in Azerbaijani media would not necessarily be significant.
The language, however, deserves attention because allegations of Armenian “provocations,” territorial claims and threats to Azerbaijani sovereignty have previously accompanied periods of heightened tension between the two countries.
The emerging argument has a clear structure: Armenia is portrayed as the side challenging the status quo and Azerbaijan as responding to those actions.
That does not establish that another military operation is being prepared. There is currently no public evidence demonstrating such a decision.
But this type of messaging can create a political and informational framework through which a future escalation could later be explained or justified.
What makes the accusation particularly notable is that Armenia’s current leadership is publicly arguing in the opposite direction.
On September 17, Nikol Pashinyan said that the former Azerbaijani Soviet-era enclaves are not included within Armenia’s stated internationally recognized territory of 29,743 square kilometers. He argued that departing from that territorial framework would place Armenia outside what he called the boundaries of “international legitimacy” and could create grounds for action against it.
Days earlier, he had again said that Tigranashen, which he has begun referring to as “Kyarki,” and the other former Azerbaijani enclaves fall outside the 29,743-square-kilometer figure, while Artsvashen is included.
At the same time, he acknowledged that Armenia and Azerbaijan have reached no practical agreement on how the enclave issue will ultimately be resolved.
The contrast is notable.
While Yerevan’s leadership is explicitly rejecting claims to territories it considers outside Armenia’s 29,743 square kilometers, Azerbaijani media are simultaneously reporting allegations that Armenian state institutions are supporting territorial claims against Azerbaijan.
The rhetoric is also developing against a background of increased Azerbaijani military activity.
On August 11, Ilham Aliyev attended a ceremony in Nakhijevan where battle flags were presented to newly established operational commando units of Azerbaijan’s Separate Combined Arms Army.
A little more than a month later, Azerbaijan began the three-country “Power of Unity 2026” exercise with Turkey and Uzbekistan.
The exercise is being conducted at three locations, including the Garabaghlar Training Center in Nakhijevan, and involves military personnel, combat equipment, aviation, naval assets and unmanned aerial vehicles.
According to Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry, its objectives include improving readiness for joint operations, troop coordination and the combat capabilities of participating units.
None of this, by itself, demonstrates preparations for war.
The formation of military units is not evidence that they will be used against Armenia, and military exercises are a routine feature of armed forces.
The relevant question is whether the political rhetoric develops alongside additional observable changes.
That is where Azerbaijan’s latest messaging deserves closer attention.
The accusation being advanced does not appear to require Armenia itself to make a formal territorial claim. Azerbaijani reporting instead broadens the allegation to include political debate, public rhetoric, lobbying, experts and supposed support from unnamed Armenian state institutions.
That makes the claim unusually elastic.
Even if Armenia’s leadership formally accepts the 29,743-square-kilometer framework and rejects claims beyond it, political statements elsewhere in Armenian society could still be characterized by Baku as evidence of Armenian revisionism.
For years, Armenia’s authorities have argued that recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, reliance on the Alma-Ata Declaration and the abandonment of territorial claims would reduce the risk of renewed conflict.
The latest Azerbaijani allegations demonstrate that those formal positions do not necessarily prevent Baku from continuing to accuse Armenia of territorial ambitions.
Whether the current rhetoric develops into something more significant will depend on what follows.
Indicators worth watching include a sustained increase in Azerbaijani reports of Armenian “provocations,” coordinated official statements alleging violations of sovereignty, repeated claims that Armenia is sabotaging the peace process, unusual military activity near the border and increasingly detailed arguments aimed at international audiences explaining why Azerbaijan believes it has been compelled to respond.
One report does not establish such a pattern.
If the same narrative begins appearing consistently across Azerbaijani officials, state-linked media and military messaging, however, it would warrant much closer scrutiny.
