After the results of the elections in Gyumri and Parakar, where the opposition secured the majority and mayorship, there have been talks among followers or those affiliated with opposition groups about the possibility of defeating Nikol Pashinyan in the upcoming national elections. This is a very dangerous misconception—and here’s why.

Comparing victories in local self-government (LSG) elections with the potential for success in national parliamentary contests not only misunderstands Armenia’s political reality but risks leading opposition movements into strategic dead ends. The 2025 Gyumri elections and the 2021 national elections show that these two electoral processes are so fundamentally different that drawing direct conclusions from one to the other is not just unserious—it’s misleading.

Different Elections, Different Universes

Let’s start with the basics. The 2025 Gyumri City Council elections involved nine political forces and 372 candidates. Around 112,000 people were eligible to vote—many of them residents with personal or family ties to the candidates. The issues on the table were municipal: infrastructure, public services, local development.

Compare this to the 2021 national parliamentary elections. With nearly 2.6 million registered voters and 25 competing political forces, the stakes were exponentially higher. The outcome determined who would govern a country still reeling from war, economic pressure, and internal political fragmentation. Civil Contract, led by Pashinyan, won 53.92% of the vote—despite widespread frustration—because the campaign narrative was about national stability and sovereignty, not potholes and trash collection.

Personal Networks vs. Party Machines

In local elections, informal networks and individual reputations matter far more than party labels or ideology. In Gyumri, Transparency International and Panorama.am highlighted how local elites and patronage systems shaped the outcome. Candidates succeeded not because of national platforms but because they knew the right people, had community trust, or could mobilize local resources.

In national elections, that dynamic flips. Parties dominate, and their performance hinges on national narratives, institutional resources, and media access. The “Armenia” Alliance and “I Have Honor” didn’t fail in 2021 because they were unpopular in Shirak or Ararat—they failed because they couldn’t present a compelling national alternative or counter the administrative machinery backing Pashinyan.

Voter Psychology Isn’t Transferrable

It’s a mistake to project the enthusiasm of local victories onto the national stage. Voter motivation in LSG elections is often hyper-specific and emotional: a neighbor is running, a community issue is unresolved, or there’s a desire to check local power. National elections, especially in crisis contexts like 2021, are shaped by fear, fatigue, and strategic calculations.

In 2021, voter turnout was 49.4%. In Gyumri 2025, despite broad interest, turnout was reportedly lower than expected. Local victories often mask apathy, controlled participation, or selective mobilization. Believing that this energy automatically scales up to the national level ignores how deeply different the two political worlds are.

Misusing Administrative Resources: Scale Matters

Yes, both local and national elections have seen abuses of administrative resources. But the scale and mechanisms are entirely different. In 2021, national authorities used media control and institutional pressure to influence the vote. In Gyumri 2025, there were targeted police raids on opposition candidates—serious, yes, but localized.

Pretending these are the same only flattens the conversation and gives false hope. What works—or fails—in Gyumri doesn’t prove anything about what might happen in a national election, where Pashinyan still controls the narrative, the resources, and the institutions.

False Parallels Lead to False Strategies

The danger in comparing local and national elections is that it creates a false sense of momentum. It leads opposition figures to mistake tactical wins for strategic breakthroughs. It encourages the public to believe that regime change is around the corner, when in reality, the structure of national power remains largely intact.

To defeat Pashinyan—or any dominant political force—requires building a credible national movement, capable of communicating a unified message, inspiring trust across regions, and withstanding institutional resistance. Local wins can be part of that story, but they’re not the climax.

Final Thoughts

The optimism that followed Gyumri and Parakar is understandable. Any democratic success in Armenia’s complex political landscape is worth celebrating. But we cannot afford illusions. Local and national elections are different games, with different rules and different winners. Confusing the two doesn’t just misread the map—it risks leading the country in circles.